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Two decisions authored by Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals have drawn considerable attention to rolling contracts.1
A rolling contract is a deal in which the contract either is not formed
until, or is modified when, the last terms are presented for assent. In a
rolling contract, the buyer does not see most of the terms until after the
goods are shipped, and the buyer has already paid for them. The seller
simply includes a copy of its standard terms in the box in which it
delivers the goods. Enclosed instructions from the seller also inform the
buyer that it must return the goods within a specified time period or
become bound by the additional terms. The issue raised by rolling
contracts is whether the seller’s additional standard terms are
enforceable.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A. 1966, J.D.
1972, University of Oregon. The Author thanks Professors Richard E. Speidel, William
H. Henning, and Michael B. Kelly for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
essay. The arguments advanced are the sole responsibility of the Author.
1. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
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This paper criticizes two distinct approaches advanced by advocates of
the rolling contract concept. Judge Easterbrook’s approach is based
upon principles of contract formation. This essay shows that his analysis is
replete with distortion and avoidance of the relevant contract principles.2
Professor Robert Hillman focuses on the contract terms, arguing that,
irrespective of faulty analysis concerning contract formation, the terms
included in the box should nevertheless be part of the contract between
the parties.3 This essay challenges his doctrinal bases to support
inclusion of the terms in the contract and argues, in addition, that
inclusion of the terms represents an inappropriate normative choice.
I. CONTRACT FORMATION
The initial decision by the Seventh Circuit is ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.4 The case involved the purchase of computer software that
was sold in a box packaged in cellophane shrinkwrap. The software was
on a CD-ROM disc (“compact disc–read only memory”) and contained
more than 3000 telephone directories. ProCD offered this database to
consumers and to merchants at different prices. The box containing the
software that was directed toward the consumer market was much less
expensive but contained a restriction that limited its use to
noncommercial purposes. This license actually popped up on the
computer screen each time the software was run. A buyer purchased the
consumer package of the software at a retail outlet, but subsequently
ignored the license restriction by using it in his business. When ProCD
filed suit to enjoin this use, the primary issue was whether the
restrictions that were not revealed until the box was opened constituted
effective terms to the contract. In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the
Seventh Circuit held that the terms were part of the contract because
they were part of the acceptance by the buyer.5 In the court’s view,
2. The parties unquestionably are free to vary the effect of provisions of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2002). The parties thus could
negotiate to use a rolling contract format as the basis to establish any resulting contract.
Rolling contracts, however, are a variation of the effect of the relevant Article 2
provisions, and in order to be effective, the variation must be by agreement. Id.
3. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002).
4. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447.
5. The court simply assumed that Article 2 governed the transaction. Most cases
that have addressed the issue have concluded that software licensing agreements are
“transactions in goods” within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., Colonial Life Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993); Novacore Techs., Inc. v.
GST Communications Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d, 229 F.3d 1133
(1st Cir. 1999); Taylor Inv. Corp. v. Weil, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Minn. 2001). But
see Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
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ProCD had extended an offer that invited acceptance through conduct by
the buyer that was specified in the offer’s terms.
The decision by Judge Easterbrook took a particularly disturbing turn
when he subsequently extended it to apply to a transaction that clearly
involved a sale of goods. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,6 a customer
ordered a computer from Gateway over the telephone and paid for it by
giving a credit card number. Gateway shipped the computer to the
customer, but inside the box was a list of terms and a notice that stated
the terms would apply unless the customer returned the computer within
thirty days. When the customer filed an action with respect to the
computer and its components, Gateway insisted that the arbitration
clause included in the list of terms applied. After losing on this position
before the district court, Gateway succeeded on appeal before the
Seventh Circuit.7
Judge Easterbrook simply applied the ProCD case in Hill, stating that
ProCD “holds that terms inside a box of software bind consumers who
use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them
6. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147.
7. The ProCD and Hill opinions have been followed in other cases. Levy v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1060 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (stating that an
arbitration provision was included in the standard terms delivered with a computer
system); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (discussing a
computer with standard terms in the box; arbitration clause); Westendorf v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1110 (Del. Chan. 2000) (discussing same), aff’d, 763
A.2d 92 (Del. 2000); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1143 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1999) (discussing a computer Zip drive with standard terms in a box;
disclaimer of implied warranty); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (discussing the shrinkwrap packaging of software with licensing
agreement; limitation of remedies) (includes a dissenting opinion); Peerless Wall &
Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(discussing packing of software with limitation and disclaimer of warranties), aff’d
without opinion, 234 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 2000); O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003) (stating that term included in telephone packaging was
accepted based on the failure to return the telephone). For an earlier case employing
similar reasoning see Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that when the buyer learned of a warranty limitation
after the sale but used the product with knowledge of the limitation, the limitation
became part of the contract because the book of directions stated that the product could
be returned if the limitation was not satisfactory). The Court in a recent opinion,
Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 795 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004),
applied the reasoning of ProCD and Hill, but distinguished its case in the absence of a
clear indication that a customer who was unwilling to agree to the new terms could
simply return the product. The court concluded that the plaintiffs “did not ‘knowingly
consent’ to the terms and conditions of the agreement because they were not given
sufficient notice of the method to reject those terms.” Id. at 804.
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by returning the product”8 and concluding that the same principle applies
to any goods. Such a proposition is far too broad. As the rest of this
section of the essay demonstrates, it overthrows several basic contract
principles. The customer was bound under the Hill decision simply by
failing to return the computer within the designated time period.9
The core of the problem with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit is the
court’s blind insistence that a statement, made originally in ProCD and
repeated in Hill, applies to the facts of the cases. The statement is as
follows: “A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by
conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that
constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the
vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”10 The statement is entirely
accurate as a general statement of law, but it does not fit the facts that
were before the court.
This point is the most obvious in Hill. The customer called Gateway
and agreed to purchase a specified computer. Most likely, the Gateway
representative promised to ship such a computer to the customer.
This exchange of promises created a contract.11 Even if the Gateway
representative did not make this promise, Gateway shipped the
computer, which would also be the basis of finding contract formation.
These results are particularly clear in the Hill context because of
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-206(1)(b). It provides that
“an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods.” The court ignores the agreed upon exchange made
between the parties and simply begins its analysis with the unwarranted
assumption that the seller extends the offer in shipping the goods
together with a list of contract terms.12 In reality, a contract was already
formed and the seller sought to impose additional terms unilaterally by
8. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
9. Gateway made the burden greater subsequently by reducing the time period
from thirty days to five days. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D.
Kan. 2000).
10. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
11. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2002).
12. The effect of such broad categorizations as a substitute for analysis of the
specific transaction is shown in a subsequent case against Gateway on precisely the same
issues. The court in Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572, perpetuated the categorization:
“Transactions involving ‘cash now, terms later’ have become commonplace, enabling
the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated merchandise such as computers over
the phone or by mail—and even by computer.” Referencing the ProCD and Hill cases,
the New York court concluded expansively that “we agree with their rationale that, in
such transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the placement of the order or
even upon the receipt of the goods.” Id.
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requiring the buyer either to accept them or to forgo its contract benefit.
The Seventh Circuit, and the courts that have followed its lead, use
section 2-204 for support, but they distort the provision in the process.13
Section 2-204(2) provides that “[a]n agreement sufficient to constitute a
contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is
undetermined.” The moment of the making of the contract in cases like
Hill, however, is not undetermined. Depending upon the response of the
sales representative, it occurred upon a promise to ship the computer or
upon shipment of the computer.14 The Seventh Circuit analysis ignores the
legal effect of the prior exchange between the parties and arbitrarily
selects the terms sent by the vendor with the goods as the offer to form a
contract. Section 2-204(2) does not grant courts a license to disregard
contracts that the parties have created in order to achieve a different
result.
Judge Easterbrook also makes a disingenuous attempt in ProCD to
draw support from section 2-606.15 This section binds a buyer to
acceptance of goods tendered by the seller if the buyer fails to make an
effective rejection following a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
tendered goods.16 Judge Easterbrook views the ProCD and Gateway
method of contracting as an opportunity for buyers to reject following an
opportunity to inspect the terms submitted with the goods. He sees
support in section 2-606 because it shows that the UCC allows parties to
structure transactions in which the buyer is given a chance to make a
final decision after detailed review.17 Every buyer in a sales contract has
a duty to accept conforming goods that are properly tendered.18 In the
event that the goods fail to conform to the contract, the buyer has the
right to reject them,19 but the buyer must act expeditiously in order to
invoke its right to reject.20 Buyers that delay excessively will be held to
have accepted the goods,21 thereby invoking the legal consequences of

13. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312–13 (Wash. 2000).
14. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
15. 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
16. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
17. The final decision afforded to the buyer by section 2-606 has to do with
conformance of the goods to the contract, not with the terms of the deal.
18. U.C.C. §§ 2-301, 2-507(1).
19. Id. § 2-601.
20. Id. § 2-602.
21. Id. § 2-606(1)(b).
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an acceptance,22 including waiver of any right to reject.23 Even if the
buyer does rightfully reject the goods, the buyer retains its rights under
the contract.24 On the other hand, buyers do not have a duty to either
accept terms submitted by their sellers after the contract is formed or
reject the goods.25 Furthermore, under the ProCD approach, a buyer that
rejects Gateway’s additional terms by returning the goods is forced into
giving up its benefits under the contract.
The federal district court in Kansas rejected the ProCD and Hill
analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.26 The plaintiff
sought to bring a class action suit concerning breach of contract and
warranty, but Gateway argued that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate
the claims. The same standard terms, including the arbitration clause
that was at issue in Hill, were included with the computer delivered to
the plaintiff, except that the time allowed to reject the terms and the
contract had been shortened from thirty days to five days. The court
found nothing in either of the opinions of the Seventh Circuit to support
the proposition that the vendor was the offeror.27 In the case before it,
the evidence was in dispute as to whether Klocek purchased the
computer over the telephone or in person at a retail establishment. The
court determined that Gateway did not provide any evidence in either
instance that it was the offeror. It stated:
The Court therefore assumes for purposes of the motion to dismiss that
plaintiff offered to purchase the computer (either in person or through catalog
order) and that Gateway accepted plaintiff’s offer (either by completing the
sales transaction in person or by agreeing to ship and/or shipping the computer
to plaintiff).28

22. Id. § 2-607.
23. Id. § 2-607(2).
24. Id. § 2-711(1).
25. Buyers, of course, are free to agree to modifications of contract terms. Id. § 2209(1).
26. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338–39 (D. Kan. 2000). The
district court subsequently granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff joined in the motion to dismiss. Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 2000 WL 1372886 (D. Kan.). The Klocek analysis is consistent with
some prior cases. Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (contract for purchase of software was already created before the vendor
presented the buyer with the license agreement); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (terms of licensing agreement sent with the software
were not part of the contract); United States Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
1201 (D. Kan. 1998) (sales contracts for surgical instruments were concluded upon
receipt of the customer orders), aff’d, 185 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Paul v.
Timco, Inc., 811 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (arbitration provision sent
with an extended warranty after the contract for the purchase of an automobile had been
formed was unenforceable).
27. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
28. Id. at 1340.
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The Seventh Circuit does raise some important policy considerations
in its decisions in ProCD and Hill. It would be an inefficient and
frustrating way to conduct business for the computer sales representative
to read several pages of contract terms to buyers over the telephone.
Furthermore, disputes could easily arise concerning real or fake
assertions that the sales representative did not read a particular term. On
the other hand, there are ways to proceed with a rolling contract without
resorting to Judge Easterbrook’s approach. The sales representative can
at least be required to divulge during the conversation that several
contract terms will be included with the shipped product and that the
buyer must take specified action to avoid being bound to a contract with
these terms.29 If the customer then proceeds with the transaction, the
vendor then indeed would be the master of its counter-offer.30
Easterbrook’s opinions, however, sweepingly make any terms that a
vendor includes together with the ordered goods terms of the contract if
the customer has the option to return the goods and forgo the contract.
He supports for this proposition by comparing tickets purchased for
transportation that contain several terms on the subsequently delivered
tickets and insurance contracts that become effective before the actual
policy, with its detailed terms, is forwarded to the customer.31 He also
points out the inclusion of a manufacturer’s express warranty that is
included inside the factory sealed carton of consumer goods.32 From the
existence of contracts in these transactions where there is payment first
and the terms are sent later, Easterbrook extrapolates and characterizes
all such transactions as comparable.
The contexts, however, are different in these transactions. Federal law
and international treaties require the inclusion of many terms on transit
29. The transaction in Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr.,
Inc., 743 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), is illustrative. The software ordered by
the buyer arrived with a license agreement affixed to the outside of the box and a sticker
on the package indicating that by opening the package the buyer indicated its consent to
the license agreement. In addition, however, the sales order form for the software
specifically stated that it incorporated a license agreement and indicated that the license
agreement was available for review by the buyer prior to signing the order. The court
held that the sales contract incorporated the license agreement by reference.
30. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
627, 644 (2002) (“There is no reason in principle why contracts cannot be formed in
stages, provided the circumstances or prior practice makes this clear or adequate notice is
provided.”).
31. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
32. Id.
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tickets,33 and even consumers who secure a binder for an insurance
policy fully expect to receive a policy later that spells out more detailed
terms. Some courts have recognized that express warranties delivered to
the consumer with the product are binding if they become part of the
basis of the bargain,34 but they generally have also refused to recognize a
disclaimer of implied warranties delivered in this manner because of the
absence of the buyer’s indication of assent.35 In the absence of any prior
notification or applicable trade usage or course of dealing,36 however,
parties purchasing goods are not going to anticipate that their contract
rights and remedies on the purchase are going to be contingent upon
terms that the vendor includes with delivery of the product. Under these
circumstances, the understanding is that the deal has been closed, and
33. “Try looking at what comes with the airline ticket—it is mostly stuff required
by federal regulation (no smoking and exit-row seating restrictions) or international
treaty (Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol Amendment, and the like).” See The
Gateway Thread—AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1195 (2000)
(comments of Professor Jean Braucher).
34. “If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when
taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a
modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable
and in order (Section 2-209).” U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7. See, e.g., Autzen v. John C.
Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 572 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1977) (involving post-sale representation
by the seller concerning the soundness of the hull of the purchased boat); Jones v.
Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (involving post-sale assurance of repair as
a binding express warranty); Paskell v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn.
1994) (involving post-sale guarantee extended by the manufacturer of the roof and
rafters of a mobile home as a modification of the terms of the sale); Marston v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 448 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Va. 1978) (discussing an enforceable
warranty included in a label on chemical containers); Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d
1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (involving buyer who did not make safety modifications in
reliance on the seller’s postsale representations).
35. “According to most pre-Code law, ‘if a bargain with even an implied warranty
has once arisen, a subsequent disclaimer of warranty when the goods are delivered will
not avail the seller.’ The same rule has generally prevailed under the Code.” JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 435–36 (5th ed. 2000); see,
e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 333 S.E.2d 67 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(disclaimer of implied warranties and limitation of remedies printed on delivered bags of
corn seed were ineffective to modify the contract already created because there was no
evidence that the buyer was aware of the term or had accepted it); Morgan Bros., Inc. v.
Haskell Corp., 604 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (inclusion of a limitations-ofdamages provision in the seller’s invoice did not result in a modification of the contract);
Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (disclaimer
in new car manual delivered to buyer after sale consummated held ineffective); Vandalia
Ranch, Inc. v. Farmers Union Oil & Supply Co., 718 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1986) (disclaimer
and remedy limitation in herbicide manufacturer’s manual received after the sale was not
effective because buyer was not aware of the terms at the time of contracting). For
numerous additional cases see the cases cited in WILLIAM H. HENNING ET AL., THE LAW
OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11:32 (2002).
36. In M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash.
2000), the parties had a course of dealing over several years under which all of the
software provided was distributed under a licensing agreement.
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that understanding establishes a contract under Article 2 of the UCC.
The result in ProCD, unlike Hill, arguably can be justified on this
basis if the commercial expectation among consumers is that software
will be accompanied by restrictions concerning its use. Evidence
presented in M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.37 showed
that licensing agreements are used extensively throughout the software
industry. A primary rationale for the promulgation of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)38 was to establish a
legal framework for computer information models that is based more on
the licensing of intellectual property than on a model such as the sale of
goods.39 The Seventh Circuit chose to extend ProCD beyond software,40
but it also distorted the contract formation framework in both cases.
The propositions advanced in the ProCD and Hill opinions cause
problems in the typical case that invokes the battle of the forms. In such
a case, the seller and the buyer send each other forms printed with their
standard terms, and those forms are not consistent with one another.
When a dispute subsequently arises between the parties, the contract
forms are inconsistent with respect to some of the terms. Section 2-207
abrogates the mirror image rule by providing that a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms that are additional to or different from those that
are offered, unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional upon
assent to the additional or different terms. In the absence of the
conditional acceptance, a contract is formed. Any of the additional or
37. Id.
38. UCITA was promulgated as a model statute in 1999 by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law.
39. UCITA covers “computer information transactions.” UCITA § 103(a). It
allows customers to become bound to terms that are available after access to the product
or service. The customer must manifest its assent to the terms after an opportunity to
review them. The customer has a right of return if it decides to reject the terms. Id. §§
208(1), 209(a), (b), 112(e); see also note 93 infra.
40. “Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCD to software, but where’s the sense in that?
ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of software.” Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Shubha Ghosh, Where’s the Sense in
Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16 TOURO L.
REV. 1125, 1136 (2000). Ghosh states:
The central holding in ProCD is that copyright law does not pre-empt contract
law, and therefore a creator can protect his interest in a database not protected
by copyright law through the use of contract terms. A more appropriate
generalization is that ProCD is about the law of intellectual property and hence
irrelevant to the facts of Gateway 2000.
Id.
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different terms that are material will not become part of the contract
formed, even between merchants, “unless expressly agreed to by the
other party.”41
The Seventh Circuit’s position (that terms included by the vendor in
the packaging with the goods that it delivers will become part of the
contract unless the buyer complies with the vendor’s requirements to
return the goods) runs counter to the provisions of section 2-207. If a
buyer extends an offer through its form and the seller accepts through its
form, but does not make its acceptance conditional upon the buyer’s
assent to any additional or different terms, a contract is formed at that
point. The seller can neither unilaterally modify the contract thereafter
by sending further terms with the goods,42 nor condition the rights of the
buyer under the contract already formed to assent by the buyer to further
terms.43
The court in both ProCD and Hill ignores any relationship to section
2-207 with the cavalier conclusion that the section is irrelevant when the
transaction involves only one written form. This position is simply an
inaccurate statement of law. Section 2-207(1) clearly applies when
parties form an oral contract and one of them sends the other party a
written confirmation of the terms of their contract.44 If the written
material sent in the package with the computer constituted the vendor’s
written confirmation,45 the additional terms would all have been treated
as proposals for addition to the contract, and they would not have
become operative because the recipient had not expressly assented to
them.46
41. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (2002). The new proposed amendments to section 2207 delete any special rules with respect to merchants. For a discussion of the proposed
amendment, see text accompanying notes 91–97 infra.
42. See notes 66–76 infra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 60–61 infra and accompanying text.
44. The Comments to section 2-207 certainly recognize transactions in which each
of the parties sends its form as a typical situation for which the section is designed. Like
the text of section 2-207(1), however, the Comments also recognize the situation in
which only one of the parties sends a confirmatory memorandum to an oral contract: “the
written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal
correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending
formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not
discussed.” U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
45. The court in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000),
states that the standard terms included with the packaged Gateway computer could have
constituted a written confirmation and that section 2-207 applies to the transaction. The
court in Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), held that
the licensing agreement on the software should have been treated as a written
confirmation that could not automatically become part of the contract between the
merchants because the terms in the licensing agreement materially altered the terms of
the offer.
46. U.C.C. § 2-207(2); United States Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
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Arguably, the materials sent by the vendors in Hill did not constitute a
written confirmation of the existing contract.47 Rather than confirming
the contract terms that the parties had agreed upon previously, the
written material purported to bind the buyer to additional terms unless
the buyer disavowed the entire contract by taking the timely action
dictated by the vendor. If the writing was not a written confirmation, the
additional terms still would not have been part of the contract. The
seller simply proposed an option to modify the existing contract or to
rescind it.48 Either option in this context requires the express consent of
the buyer.49 Once it enters into a contract with the buyer, the vendor
cannot unilaterally change the terms of the contract—not even when
allowing the alternative of ending the contract. The comments to section
2-207 clearly recognize this fundamental premise of contract law:
“Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial understanding
has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract.”50 This is certainly
what happened in Hill: the deal had been closed in commercial
understanding and the vendor subsequently sought to establish further
terms to an existing contract. The fatal flaw in the ProCD and Hill
analyses is the abject failure to even address the legal significance of the
exchange between the parties prior to the delivery of the goods.51 Just
1201 (D. Kan. 1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
47. See Tubelite v. Risica & Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1991) (“The
acknowledgments that followed were not a formal confirmation of [sic] parties’
agreement because they did not contain the terms specifically negotiated and agreed to
by the parties.”).
48. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
49. Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993);
Orris, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; see notes 67–76 infra and accompanying text for an
enhanced discussion.
50. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2.
51. Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Hill v. Gateway has been soundly criticized
for its distortion of contract formation principles. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Delayed
Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE
L. REV. 1805, 1819–24 (2000); Shubba Ghosh, supra note 40, at 1132–35; John E.
Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869,
905–07 (2002); Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the
Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205, 1217, 1223–27
(2000). The extent of the dissatisfaction with the Easterbrook approach can be discerned
from the American Association of Law Schools Contracts Listserv interchanges among
law professors concerning the Gateway decision. See The Gateway Thread – AALS
Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1148–49 (comments of Professor Stewart
Macaulay), 1153–55 (Mark Gergen), 1155 (Tom Stipanowich), 1156–57, 1168–69
(Harry Flechtner), 1174–76 (Spencer Neth), 1177–79 (Mark S. Scarberry), 1189–90 (Jay
Mootz), 1190–91 (Peter Linzer) (2000) [hereinafter Gateway Thread]. Student
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because the parties can contract in the manner described by the Seventh
Circuit does not mean that they actually did.
II. CONTRACT TERMS
Professor Robert Hillman contends that Judge Easterbrook’s distortion
of contract formation principles should make no difference.52 He poses
a variety of different methods by which Gateway’s terms could
nevertheless become binding even though the parties formed their
contract before the buyers received the terms.53 First, Gateway could
have made out a case that retention of the computer beyond the thirty
day period stipulated by Gateway constituted an implicit agreement by
the buyers to modify the agreement. Second, Gateway could have
argued that the buyers impliedly agreed to delegate to Gateway the right
to fix the terms. Third, Gateway could have demonstrated that one of
the terms that was part of the contract was an implied condition that the
buyers would agree to terms that Gateway would send later.
This approach essentially perpetuates, on a different level, the same
type of error in which Judge Easterbrook indulged. Whereas Judge
Easterbrook addressed contract formation and focused on what the
parties could have done rather than on what they actually did, Professor
Hillman takes the same approach with respect to contract terms.
Because mechanisms exist by which a buyer could agree to incorporate
terms to be provided subsequently by the seller into an existing contract,
Professor Hillman chooses to bind the buyer to these terms on the basis
that any one of these mechanisms should be assumed for consumer
buyers.
All of the methods advanced by Professor Hillman for inclusion of the
Gateway terms are grounded in an implicit agreement by the buyer—an
implicit agreement to modify the contract, an implicit agreement to
commentators have also criticized the contract analysis in ProCD and Hill. See Mark
Andrew Cerny, Comment, A Shield Against Arbitration: U.C.C. Section 2–207’s Role in
the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Included with Delivery of Products, 51
ALA. L. REV. 821 (2000); Mark A. French, Recent Developments: Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 811 (1997); Jason Kuchmay, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg: Section 301 Copyright Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses—A Real Bargain
for Consumers?, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 117 (1997); Kristin Johnson Hazelwood, Let the
Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit’s Approach to Accept-or-Return Offers, 55 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1287 (1998); Kell Corrigan Mercer, Consumer Shrink-Wrap Licenses and
Public Domain Materials; Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code
Validity in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287 (1997); Christopher L.
Pitet, Note, The Problem With “Money Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 325
(1997).
52. Hillman, supra note 3, at 754–56.
53. Id. at 753–54.
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allow Gateway to fix the terms, or an implicit condition based on
agreement to the later terms. These “implicit” agreements are simply
fictions advanced to circumvent established contract principles that
preclude inclusion of the terms under the facts of the case. This reliance
upon implicit agreements leads inevitably to recognition that sellers
unilaterally can inject terms into a bargain that will become part of any
continuing contract agreement.
The advancement of a theory that an implied condition was created
under which the Hills agreed to agree to terms that would be sent later
by Gateway is particularly disturbing. It grants the seller an open
opportunity to convert its acceptance into a conditional acceptance
simply by enclosing additional terms with the goods shipped, and it
accomplishes this monumental transformation through the process of
implication. This approach to contract formation is one that exceeds
even the debunked Roto-Lith opinion.54 Despite the inclusion of different or
additional terms, a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance is
an acceptance under section 2-207(1), “unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”55 The
Roto-Lith opinion essentially concluded that the acceptance in the
seller’s form was by implication conditional simply through the
conspicuous inclusion of additional material terms. The opinion met
with widespread disapproval, and the First Circuit later overruled it.56
Professor Hillman’s theory goes even further than Roto-Lith: Simply
through the process of entering into the contract, the seller’s agreement
is, by implication, conditioned upon the buyer’s agreement to any later
terms supplied by the seller. Unlike the situation in Roto-Lith, the
acceptance is made conditional, even though the additional terms were
not even provided at the time of contract formation.
Analysis of the theory does not improve by characterizing the
additional terms as part of a written confirmation sent by the seller. The
contract in Hill was already formed, either with Gateway’s promise to
ship or with its prompt shipment of the computer.57 Gateway could not
later unilaterally undo the contract simply by sending a written
confirmation that expressly required the Hills to agree to new or
54. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), overruled
by Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997).
55. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (emphasis added).
56. Ionics, 110 F.3d 184.
57. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b); see notes 11 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
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different terms.58 A contrary approach enables the seller that has
committed itself to a contract to deprive the buyer of its bargain and
require the buyer who wants the goods to contract again on the modified
terms of the seller.59 Similarly, Gateway cannot convert its acceptance
into a conditional acceptance simply by sending a written confirmation
with the goods that requires the buyer to take specified actions or be
bound by the seller’s additional terms.60 A contrary approach here is
58. “A party should not be able to escape an oral contract through a confirmation.”
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 44 n.45. Section 2-207(1) addresses the situation
when the parties form an oral contract and one or both of the parties send a written
memorandum of the terms agreed upon as well as some additional or different terms.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1. Under these circumstances the confirmation operates as an
acceptance, which inevitably means a continuation of any acceptance that forms the oral
contract. Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1047 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980). The additional terms in the confirmation sent to a consumer are only
proposals for addition to the contract under section 2-207(2). Am. Parts Co. v. Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, 154 N.W.2d 5, 15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that sending a form
with terms following oral agreement does not “change the agreement or prevent the
formation of the contract, or place one party or another in the position of waiving the
benefit of the agreement or becoming bound to unagreed small or large print by
proceeding with performance of those terms upon which the parties, in fact, did orally
agree”).
59. In ProCD, on the other hand, Judge Easterbrook indicated that if the consumer
opened the box and discovered an insert that stated that the consumer owed the seller an
additional $10,000, the buyer could simply prevent contract formation by returning the
package. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
60. Section 2-207(1) requires an acceptance to be expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms. When the parties orally conclude an
agreement and one of the parties anticipates sending a confirmation that will include
additional or different terms, that party must, when orally concluding the agreement,
expressly make its commitment to the agreement conditional on assent to the new or
different terms. Otherwise, the contract is formed on the initial terms and the new or
different terms are merely a proposal for a modification of those initial terms. Gateway,
for example, could have made its agreement expressly conditioned to its standard terms
by making it clear to the buyer that additional important terms to the contract would be
included with the computer and that the seller was willing to sell the computer only if the
buyer agreed to those terms. As the court in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. determined,
however, Gateway “provides no evidence that it informed plaintiff of the five-day
review-and-return period as a condition of the sales transaction, or that the parties
contemplated additional terms to the agreement.” 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan.
2000); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991)
(during negotiations leading to purchase of the programs, vendor never mentioned the
box-top license or obtained buyer’s express assent to it). “[A] conditional acceptance
analysis very rarely is appropriate in cases in which a contract has been formed, at the
latest, by performance, but the goods arrive with conditions attached.” Ariz. Retail Sys.,
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993). The last clause of
section 2-207(1) “can only refer to an ‘acceptance’ that is expressly made conditional
and not to a written confirmation because the confirmation serves only as a
memorandum of an agreement and cannot impose additional or different terms
conditionally since the contract has already been formed.” Album Graphics, 408 N.E.2d
at 1048.
Surely a party who has entered into an agreement cannot change that
agreement by the simple expedient of sending a written “confirmation”
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even more undesirable because it enables the seller to ensnare an
inattentive buyer into a continued contractual relationship on the seller’s
dictated terms.61
The respective analyses of Hill by both Easterbrook and Hillman go
even further. They both allow the seller to add terms unilaterally to the
contract not only after the contract has been formed, but also after it has
already predominantly been performed. Gateway fulfilled its contract
obligation to tender delivery of the goods when it shipped the computer
to the Hills.62 The Hills also performed their payment obligation because
they authorized payment in the form of a charge to their credit card. The
seller thus added terms to the contract after it was both formed and
performed. The buyer’s only recourse against these additional terms
was to spot the offensive terms included in the literature that the seller
sent with the merchandise and to take the action specified by the seller
within the time frame allowed by the seller. Otherwise, the buyer was in
a contract that included all of the seller’s terms, even though the buyer
was not even apprised of these terms until after the contract was formed
and performed by both parties.63
Professor Hillman argues that consumer buyers should be bound to the
additional terms because these buyers really do not bother to read the
terms anyway.64 Buyers clearly can become bound to contract terms that
they do not bother to read because the courts recognize a duty to read,
containing additional or different terms including an additional “conditional
assent” term providing that the other contracting party, by performing the
previously agreed upon terms, agrees to all the unagreed upon additional or
different terms.
American Parts Co., 154 N.W.2d at 15.
61. Even when a seller makes its acceptance expressly conditioned on its
additional terms, the buyer’s assent to those terms should not be implied. See Diamond
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the
buyer’s continuance with performance after receiving the seller’s conditional acceptance
did not constitute the unequivocal assent by the buyer that is required for contract
formation under section 2-207(1)). When the parties nevertheless proceed with their
performance, contract formation and terms are governed under section 2-207(3). U.C.C.
§ 2-207 cmt. 7.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-301.
63. Under the Gateway analysis, the buyer could be bound to additional terms of
which it had not yet even become aware. Gateway reduced the time to return the computer
from thirty days to five days. One can easily imagine cases in which the buyer would not
have even opened the packaging material within that reduced time frame. For example,
a computer purchased as a Christmas present might be placed under the tree unopened
for a longer period, with the buyer entirely unaware that the additional terms lurk within.
64. Hillman, supra note 3, at 746–47, 755, 757.
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which forms the basis for the buyer’s assent. The situation here, however,
is different. In the Gateway case, the contract was already formed and
the parties had proceeded with their respective performances. The
additional terms sent by the seller were nothing more than proposals for
modifications to the contract, and the seller cannot modify the contract
unilaterally.65 The duty to read does not create an obligation to peruse
all of the literature enclosed with the product by the seller.66 The absence
of a duty to read at this stage of the transaction undercuts another of the
mechanisms indicated by Professor Hillman to support inclusion of the
seller’s terms—that the Hills’ retention of the computer beyond the
thirty-day period stipulated by Gateway constituted an implicit agreement
by the Hills to modify the agreement.67
The other problem with the implicit agreement to a modification is
that the agreement would have to be express under the Gateway scenario.
In some cases an implicit agreement can qualify as a modification under
section 2-209.68 A course of performance between the parties can be
relevant to show a modification of an inconsistent term.69 The parties in
65. Rupe v. Triton Oil & Gas Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1495, 1502–03 (D. Kan. 1992)
(a party cannot modify the contract unilaterally in the absence of a contract provision
that expressly grants such power); Reliable, Inc. v. Airco Plumbing & Sheet Metal, Inc.,
547 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (noting that the seller could not unilaterally
modify the contract by sending invoices that fixed the place of payment for purposes of
establishing venue).
66. “The mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the offeree’s freedom
of action or inaction or impose on him any duty to speak.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981).
67. The decision in Gateway Co. v. Charlotte Theatres, Inc., 297 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.
1961), appears to indicate otherwise. After the parties had reduced their agreement to a
writing that did not fix a completion date, the buyer specified a date in its cover letter.
The seller ignored the specified date and completed its performance after that date. The
court held that the seller could have accepted the proposed modification through its
conduct because a modification under section 2-209 does not require consideration.
Binding the seller to the completion date could be readily supported through section 2309. “The obligation of good faith under this Act requires reasonable notification before
a contract may be treated as breached because a reasonable time for delivery or demand
has expired.” U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 5. “Effective communication of a proposed time limit
calls for a response, so that failure to reply will make out acquiescence.” Id. at cmt. 6.
68. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 53 (discussing course of performance
and “conduct by both parties not constituting a course of performance but which may
fairly be construed as a modifying agreement”). “[I]f a court asks whether the conduct
of the parties amounted to a ‘modification,’ it will determine whether there was assent by
applying the usual rules for the formation of contracts . . . .” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 562 (1982); see Ho v. Wolfe, 688 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App. 1985) (stating that
a modification requires an offer and acceptance with respect to it).
69. U.C.C. § 2-208(3); see, e.g., Mulberry-Fairplains Water Ass’n v. N.
Wilkesboro, 412 S.E.2d 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (supplying excess water beyond what
the contract required resulted in a modification of the contract through a course of
performance); Ray v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that course of performance established a change in the mailing address).
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Gateway, however, had not had repeated occasions for performance by
the other party that would give rise to a course of performance.70 Consent
to a modification can also sometimes be implied from other conduct by
the parties as well. For example, if a party to a sales contract were to notify
the other party of a different time or location for delivery of the goods
and the other party simply proceeded accordingly, the contract term
would be effectively modified.71
The modification in Hill, however, was of a very different nature. The
seller’s notice that was included with the standard terms stated that the
customer would be considered to have accepted the terms if the
customer kept the computer for more than thirty days. The problem here
is that the buyer was already entitled to keep the goods beyond thirty
days.72 Because the actions of retaining and using the computer were
basic legal rights already acquired by the buyer,73 such action is simply
70. U.C.C. § 2-208(1). Ray Dancer, Inc. v. DMC Corp., 530 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (concluding that the plaintiff could not establish a pattern of purchasing which
would constitute a modification of the original contract by producing evidence of one
purchase); Prewitt v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 745 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating
that a single occasion of conduct did not establish a course of performance).
71. Paramount Supply Co. v. Sherlin Corp., 475 N.E.2d 197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984);
see also Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc. v. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 830 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (stating that where the seller claimed that the original contract was modified
to improve the quality of material and to increase the price accordingly, the acts that the
buyer received and made use of the improved products furnished a basis for concluding
that the parties had modified the terms of the original contract), rev’d, In re Atlas
Concrete Pipe, Inc., 668 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1982).
72. “Section 2-209 requires assent to proposed modifications and this court, like
the court in Step-Saver, concludes that the assent must be express and cannot be inferred
merely from a party’s conduct in continuing with the agreement.” Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc.
v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Ariz. 1993); accord United States
Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998) (concluding that a
post-sale proposed restriction included with delivery of the product required assent to be
binding and the assent had to be express), aff’d, 185 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The
court in Klocek found “that the act of keeping the computer past five days was not
sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff expressly agreed to the Standard Terms” and that
its “decision would be the same if it considered the Standard Terms as a proposed
modification under UCC § 2-209.” Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1341 & n.13 (D. Kan. 2000); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939
F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991); Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that tags on bags of seed that stated disclaimers of implied
warranties, limitations on measures of damages, and an instruction to return the seed for
a refund if these terms were unacceptable held unenforceable as a post-contractual
unilateral attempt to limit the seller’s obligations).
73. “A ‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price.” U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002). The buyer also would not be bound under the
Restatement. “An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offeror’s ownership of
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too ambiguous to support an inference of consent to the seller’s
additional terms.74 Buyers purchase goods in order to acquire title to the
goods. In entering into a sales contract with the Hills, Gateway was
obligated to deliver and transfer the goods.75 Gateway had already
tendered delivery of the goods,76 and was obligated to relinquish its
entire claim to title over them.77 If Gateway’s statement about continued
retention of the goods was an indication that it would not transfer title to
the Hills if the Hills did not consent to the standard terms, Gateway
repudiated its contract obligation.78
The doctrinal basis by which the terms become part of the contract do
not really matter to Professor Hillman. His concern is that they get
incorporated. His argument is premised around his normative approach:
“Put another way, courts should presume ‘blanket assent’ to the terms
consumers, such as the Hills, choose not to read, provided that the terms
offered property is bound in accordance with the offered terms unless they are manifestly
unreasonable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(2) (1981) (emphasis
added).
74. “When the conduct is [sic] alleged to establish a particular modification of the
contract is itself ambiguous, it will not support a claim of modification.” 2A RONALD A.
ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209:142 (3d ed. 1997).
In an illustration of when a promise may be inferred, Professor Farnsworth indicates that
if “the offeree exercises dominion over the goods by acting inconsistently with the
offeror’s ownership, as by carrying them from the railroad station to his place of
business, he is taken to have accepted the offer and is bound to pay the price.”
FARNSWORTH, supra note 68, at 142–43 (emphasis added). The buyer in Tubelite v.
Risica & Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1991), made partial payments on an
account after the seller enclosed an acknowledgment with a shipment that added a term
requiring the buyer to pay interest. Because the amount of the partial payments was less
than the principal amount due, the court held that the conduct was not sufficient to
establish consent to the contract modification because the partial payment could refer
only to reduction of the principal debt. See also Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Drexler, 216
F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1954) (concluding that the buyer’s retention of the shipped goods and
acceptance of another shipment of goods when the seller had sent a writing that
contained an arbitration clause did not bind the buyer to the new clause because the
buyer did not act “in any way inconsistent with his reliance on the original contract”);
Rupe v. Triton Oil & Gas Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Kan. 1992) (stating that a seller
under a gas purchase agreement acted consistently with its contract rights by retaining
payments that were less than required under the contract, even though the buyer had sent
a letter indicating a change to lower payments).
75. U.C.C. § 2-301.
76. Id. § 2-503.
77. “Unless otherwise explicitly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods . . . .” Id. § 2-401(2).
78. The buyer’s right to retain and use the computer entitles the buyer to assert its
“freedom from” the contract modification that the seller sought to impose based on the
buyer’s actions. See Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193,
194 (1982) (“[T]he spirit of a people at any given time may be measured by the
opportunity and incentive to exercise ‘freedom to’ and the felt necessity to assert
‘freedom from.’”).
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are not unfair in presentation or substance.”79 From this perspective,
consumer buyers are subjected to any terms of their sellers’ choosing
unless they object and cancel the contract in a timely manner. Consumer
buyers are instructed to look to the doctrine of unconscionability to
protect themselves against seller abuses.80
The term “rolling contract” is quite apt under this analysis because the
consumer certainly is getting rolled. Consumer protection is rolled back
in wholesale fashion. Anticipating the certain outcry from consumer
advocates, Professor Hillman argues that their complaints should not be
directed toward him. Instead, the critics should address lawmakers
over the inadequacies of the current law to police unconscionable
terms.81
An approach that depends for its sense of fairness on an enforcement
mechanism that is admittedly too weak to provide the necessary protection
is not a good normative choice.82 In the context of rolling contracts, it
gives sellers nearly unfettered rein to add terms of their choosing after
the contract has been formed and performed. It extends the considerable
advantage that sellers already have over consumers. It imposes a significant
burden on the consumer to establish that offensive provisions rise to the
level of unconscionability. It permits sellers to prevail on terms that are
heavily in favor of the seller. It limits buyers to challenge only highly
egregious and oppressive terms. Karl Llewellyn may have advocated
that courts should find blanket assent to conscionable standard terms,83
79. Hillman, supra note 3, at 755.
80. Professor Hillman draws upon Karl Llewellyn for support: “As with any
standard-form contract context, courts should follow Llewellyn’s model of enforcing
bargained-for terms and conscionable boilerplate, and excising egregious terms.” Id.
But see note 82 infra and accompanying text.
81. Hillman, supra note 3, at 757.
82. Professor Hillman also mentions subsection (3) of section 211 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides as follows: “Where the other
party has reason to believe that the party manifesting . . . assent would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement.” Hillman, supra note 3, at 749. He also recognizes, however, that to
date the courts have applied this section mostly to insurance contracts. Early drafts
of the revised Article 2 included a comparable provision with respect to consumer
contracts, but it was eliminated due to industry pressure. See Braucher, supra note
33, at 1816.
83. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960) (stating that courts should strike any “unreasonable or indecent” boilerplate).
Llewellyn’s earlier assessment was in more restrictive terms. See also K.N. Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939) (claiming that he would not extend a
presumption of assent to “utterly unreasonable clauses”).
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but the law of unconscionability has not evolved to reflect his
assessment that unreasonable terms are not entitled to this assent.84
The issue posed in Hill demonstrates the high barriers facing
consumers under an unconscionability challenge. The Hills contested
the additional term, which Gateway added to the rolling contract, that
required the Hills to arbitrate any disputes under the contract. In order to
make the most effective case for unconscionability of the clause, the
Hills would have to demonstrate both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.85 Professor Hillman believes that Gateway’s rolling
contract is procedurally conscionable for precisely the same reasons
advanced by Judge Easterbrook: the method is cost-efficient, consistent
with other types of transactions in which terms are provided after
payment, and convenient.86 These are rationales that have been advanced
in favor of standard form contracting.87 If they are also heralded as the
test for procedural unconscionability that is the control against abuses in
such contracting, the protection available for buyers simply evaporates
on this score. Professor Hillman dismisses a claim of substantive
unconscionability of the Gateway arbitration term with a simple
reference to national policy that favors arbitration.88 Arguably, the
policy is that parties should be encouraged to agree knowingly to
arbitration, but not that one party should be forced into giving up the
democratic right to legal remedies in court.89 The critical point here,
however, is that Professor Hillman’s own analysis of the
unconscionability protection that he advocates as the means to protect
against abuses by sellers in rolling contracts shows the meager state to
which the protection is quickly reduced.
The fairness of mandatory arbitration clauses in the context of
84. Murray, supra note 51, at 890 (“Llewellyn’s great hope for a reasoned
elaboration of the principle of unconscionability and the explicit requirement of ‘good
faith’ remains unfulfilled.”).
85. “Most courts take a ‘balancing approach’ to the unconscionability question,
and to tip the scales in favor of unconscionability, most courts seem to require a certain
quantum of procedural, plus a certain quantum of substantive, unconscionability.”
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 168; see also Hillman, supra note 3, at 749.
86. Hillman, supra note 3, at 755.
87. For a very good survey of the extensive literature concerning standard form
contracts see Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 430–55 (2002).
88. Hillman, supra note 3, at 756 (comments of Professor Franklin G. Snyder)
(“[I]t’s hard to argue that an arbitration clause itself is unconscionable, given that
Congress has declared that the national policy favors it.”) (citing Gateway Thread, supra
note 51, at 1172).
89. “[T]he FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] was not enacted to force parties to
arbitrate in the absence of an agreement. . . . The existence of an agreement to arbitrate
is a threshold matter which must be established before the FAA can be invoked.”
Avedon Eng’g, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 1997).
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consumer sales has certainly been called into question.90 A requirement
for consumers to arbitrate any dispute precludes the availability of a
class action because of arbitration system rules. With consumer claims
of about $300 for each consumer in Gateway, a class action was the only
economically viable means for dispute resolution.91 Professor Hillman’s
response to this criticism, like his response to concerns over
unconscionability as an adequate policing mechanism to deter seller
abuses, is that the critics should campaign for legislative reforms.92
The state legislatures have been approached recently concerning
changes in sales law, and the proposals advanced do not bode well for
the course charted by Professor Hillman. The Permanent Editorial
90. “Constructive assent [to arbitration], manufactured through the manipulation
of the rules of contract formation and the interpretation of silence as assent (because it is
read by the light of the judge’s belief that he knows what is best for the consumer or for
the economy), is inappropriate and undemocratic.” Post, supra note 51, at 1238. “The
question is rather under what circumstances the Gateways of the world—excellent
product or not—are entitled to immunity from the public justice system, with the public
access and public accountability that this system entails.” The Gateway Thread, supra
note 51, at 1173 (comments of Professor Charles Knapp).
[W]hat is really going on in this case [Gateway] is an attempt to take
advantage of the consumers’ practical common sense knowledge of how sales
agreements are usually constructed and to count on the likelihood that they will
not be aware of the term and will not object to its inclusion in the contract.
The seller is manipulating the buyers’ normative expectations as to what sort
of terms and norms are typically included in their agreements, and is trading on
the inability of individuals to take in all the features that are present in a novel
buying event.
Beverly Horsburgh & Andrew Cappel, Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law,
16 TOURO L. REV. 1091, 1116–17 (2000).
91. The Gateway Thread, supra note 51, at 1167 (comments of Professor Jean
Braucher). The Gateway provision required arbitration under the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, an organization headquartered in France whose
rules were difficult for consumers to even locate. A consumer claim would have
required an advance fee of $4000, including a nonrefundable registration fee of $2000.
A consumer that did not prevail could also be responsible for Gateway’s legal costs. The
court in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998), found that
the requirements created an excessive cost factor that would deter consumers from
invoking the process and were therefore substantively unconscionable. The same court,
however, rejected an assertion that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as a contract
of adhesion. It found that the consumer could reject the Gateway terms by returning the
computer and purchasing the product of a competitor. The inconvenience and expense
of such affirmative action on the part of the consumer was “seen as a trade-off for the
convenience and savings for which the consumer presumably opted when he or she
chose to make a purchase of such consequence by phone or mail as an alternative to onsite retail shopping.” Id. at 573. The court remanded for a lower court designation of an
appropriate substitute arbitrator.
92. Hillman, supra note 3, at 757–58.
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Board of the Uniform Commercial Code has promulgated amendments
to Article 2 that are being considered by the state legislatures for
enactment.93 The amendments deal even more explicitly with contract
terms.
The amendments to Article 2 change section 2-207 considerably. The
scope of the section is narrowed in that it no longer has anything to do
with contract formation. Amended section 2-207 “applies only when a
contract has been created under another section of this Article.”94 Rather
than determining contract formation, “[t]he purpose of this section is
solely to determine the terms of the contract.”95 The scope of the
amended section is broadened, on the other hand, in that it is not
restricted only to cases of the battle of the forms, but rather applies to all
contracts for the sale of goods.96 Once a contract is formed by any
method under Article 2, amended section 2-207 establishes the terms of
the contract. Amended section 2-207 provides as follows:
Subject to Section 2-202, if (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence
of a contract although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a
contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any
manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional to or different
from those in the contract being confirmed, the terms of the contract, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties agree; and
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this Act.97

This section makes it explicitly clear that the contract terms with
Gateway would consist of the terms to which both parties agreed and the
relevant gap fillers in Article 2, but not the additional terms provided
later by Gateway. The comments to the section verify this result:
“Terms of a contract may be found not only in the consistent terms of
records of the parties but also from a straightforward acceptance of an
93. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 2 (2003).
In addition to the amendments to Article 2, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
in 1999. See note 39 supra for the essence of the post-transaction terms. UCITA was
originally planned as Article 2B of the U.C.C. A cosponsor of the U.C.C.—the
American Law Institute—withdrew its support on the grounds that “[t]he provisions on
assent to post-transaction terms are inconsistent with sound contract policy and create
disincentives for vendors to disclose terms at the time of the transaction.” Memorandum
from the ALI Council Ad Hoc Committee on Article 2B (Dec. 1998); see Braucher,
supra note 51, at 1840–44 (showing the resistance of state attorney generals and senior
staff of the FTC). UCITA has been enacted in only Maryland and Virginia. See MD.
CODE ANN. COM. LAW I §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2001).
94. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (2003).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 1.
97. Id. § 2-207.
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offer.”98 Similarly, the Comments recognize the terms in a contract
formed through an offeree’s performance: “If, for example, a buyer
sends a purchase order, there is no oral or other agreement, and the seller
delivers the goods in response to the purchase order.”
The Comments to amended section 2-207 do indicate a neutral
position concerning the reasoning underlying the Hill decision.
The section omits any specific treatment of terms attached to the goods, or in or
on the container in which the goods are delivered. This article takes no position
on whether a court should follow the reasoning in Step-Saver Data Systems,
Inc. v. Wyse Technology and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. (original 2-207
governs) or the contrary reasoning in Hill v. Gateway 2000 (original 2-207
inapplicable).99

Amended Article 2, however, is not as neutral on the subject as the
comment suggests. Amended Article 2 preserves all of the former
section 2-206(1)(b), which provides that a prompt promise to ship goods
or a prompt shipment of goods following an order or other offer to buy
goods for prompt or current shipment constitutes an acceptance. Part I
of this paper has demonstrated that Judge Easterbrook’s analysis of
contract formation depends completely upon ignoring the obvious
applicability of this section. His opinion has been soundly criticized for
its distortion of principles of contract formation.100 Although the
Permanent Editorial Board unfortunately did not take the opportunity to
rebuke Easterbrook’s analysis, the amended Article 2 maintains the
statutory provision that undercuts its legitimacy.
III. CONCLUSION
The issue raised in a rolling contract—whether the terms subsequently
provided by the seller become part of the contract—is a subset of a larger
98. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
99. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (citations omitted). This Comment was the aftermath of the
Revised Article 2 process in which the leadership of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws acted under industry pressure and removed the
project from further floor debate at the 1999 annual meeting. See Braucher, supra note
51, at 1834–35; see also Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the
Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 614–18 (2000–01); Linda J. Rusch, A History and
Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52
S.M.U. L. REV. 1683, 1684–85 (1999). The draft under consideration required express
agreement for any binding effect to additional or different terms in a confirmation and
added that there could be no express agreement by “mere retention or use of goods.”
U.C.C. § 2-207(c)(3), (d) (Draft July 1999).
100. See note 51 supra.
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issue concerning the enforcement of contract terms in standardized contract
agreements. Considerable attention has been directed toward this larger
issue over the past several years, and a wide range of perspectives has
evolved among the commentators.101 The Hill line of cases, however,
clearly represents a major threat for commentators who advance the
necessity for some forms of control over standardized contracting. If the
controls—or rather lack thereof—envisioned by Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Hillman with respect to standard terms provided after both
parties have performed under the contract become the national norm, the
chances of reining in standardized contracting in other forms will
become even more remote. Rolling contracts under the Hill model
simply roll over contract law and advance a very poor policy choice.

101.
87.
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See the review of the literature provided in Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note

